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Abstract: We use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for
facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax function,
while the other uses a flat tax rate to mitigate implementation concerns. Sellers publicly declare a
price for their land. Overstating its true value is penalized by using the declared price to assess a
property tax; understating its value is penalized by allowing developers to buy the property at the
declared price. We find that both mechanisms increase the rate of land assembly and gains from
trade relative to a control in which sellers’ price declarations have no effect on their taxes.
However, these effects are statistically insignificant or transitory. The assembly rates in our selfassessment treatments are markedly higher than those of prior experimental studies in which the
buyer faces bargaining frictions, such as costly delay or capital constraints.
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1. Introduction
The allocation of property rights in real estate places society on the horns of a dilemma.
Private ownership allows landholders to demand prices in excess of their subjective valuations,
exposing government agencies and private developers to strategic holdout.

Thus, valuable

infrastructure and public goods such as highways, parks and airports may be underprovided
(Becher, 2014; Heller, 1998; Kerekes, 2011; Whitman, 2006). Yet, public ownership discourages
tenants from improving land through costly investment (Grossman and Hart, 1986), inhibits them
from finding its most valuable use through the price discovery process (Hayek, 1945) and
encourages them to overexploit its produce lest their neighbors exploit it first (Lloyd, 1833;
Hardin, 1968).
Market democracies try to skirt this dilemma by enforcing private property rights in
general, but selectively rescinding them through eminent domain when holdout threatens a
valuable development (Posner, 2014; Shavell, 2004, 2010). The justification of such a legal
regime is that it captures most of the social benefits of private property, while securing the
government the necessary powers to break up holdout problems and provide public goods.
Eminent domain, however, is not without its costs. Developers seek to maximize their own
profits, not social welfare, and those who are well connected to the condemnor may acquire
properties at below-market prices, leading to excessive assembly (Munch, 1976; Somin, 2004;
Benson, 2005; Miceli and Segerson, 2007; Chang, 2010). Furthermore, landowners will often go
to court to fight the expropriation of their property or at least increase the price they are paid. This
can lead to long delays in assembly and impose significant transaction costs in the form of legal
expenses (White, 1980; O’Flaherty, 1994). Moreover, eminent domain is not a panacea with
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respect to the land assembly problem. Both Kitchens (2014) and Portillo (2017) find that holding
out may result in a larger price.
To address the imperfections of eminent domain, scholars have proposed several
refinements and alternatives. Some propose to navigate eminent domain through introducing seller
competition (e.g. Kominers & Weyl, 2011, 2012), while others propose mechanisms to facilitate
fair outcomes when invoking eminent domain (e.g. Heller & Hills, 2008; Lehavi & Licht, 2007).
In the current paper, we focus on a more radical proposal: altering the nature of property rights in
land through a policy of binding self-assessment. Under this regime, landowners must publicly
declare a price at which they would be willing to sell their property. Overstating one’s subjective
value is discouraged by assessing a tax on the declared price. Understating one’s subjective value
is discouraged by making the declared price a binding offer to prospective land assemblers. That
is, the landowner cannot refuse a qualified offer for his property that meets or exceeds his declared
price. 2
In most U.S. jurisdictions the status quo for land assembly consists of bargaining between
buyer and seller(s) under the threat of eminent domain, with reassessment of taxable property
values upon resale. Using laboratory experiments as a “policy wind tunnel,” we test two versions
of a self-assessment regime that was proposed by Plassmann and Tideman (2008) against a variant
of the status quo that utilizes the status quo’s tax mechanism but excludes the ability to negotiate.
The first (incentive compatible) version of self-assessment includes a complex tax function based
upon the probability of a developer wanting to purchase the land, while the second version

The public may wish to place limits on what constitutes a “qualified offer.” At its most conservative, a selfassessment regime might reserve to the government alone the right to force a sale at the declared price. At the other
extreme, any individual could make a qualified offer. Intermediate policies are possible as well.
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simplifies the tax function by setting it to a flat rate. We exclude bargaining from our experimental
design to isolate the effect of taxes in our three treatments. While tax is paid by the holder of the
property at the end of the period in the status quo treatment, tax is always paid by the original
property owner under self-assessment. We find that self-assessment increases the rate of land
assembly from 70.8% to 83.3% compared to the status quo. This difference is not statistically
significant, but assembly rates in our self-assessment treatments are substantially higher than those
reported in experimental studies of land assembly through negotiation when the buyer faces capital
constraints (Collins & Isaac, 2012) or costly delay without contingent contracts (DeSantis,
McCarter & Winn, 2019). We also find self-assessment increases gains from trade though this
effect is largely transitory in that it is only present in the first of two experimental negotiations
(rounds). We test the robustness of findings with synthetic treatments – computer simulations
designed to eliminate the role of “chance” in our experimental design and parameter choices.
Our research fills a gap in the self-assessment literature by offering empirical evidence on
the efficacy of such mechanisms. The results are encouraging and suggest that self-assessment
could be a useful alternative to the status quo of bilateral bargaining and eminent domain. Future
experiments may shed light on whether self-assessment would also encourage the efficient use of
other types of property besides land, as Posner and Weyl (2017) advocate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant related literature is
discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss the theoretical properties of Plassman and
Tideman’s (2008) self-assessment system, which uses a complex tax formula to ensure that truthful
assessments are a dominant strategy, as well as a simplified version of this system. In Section 4,
we describe the experiments that we devised to test this tax regime. We present the results of the
experiments in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider the results of our self-assessment treatments
4

in light of prior experimental studies on land assembly. We offer concluding remarks in Section
7.
2. Related Literature
Our research sits at the junction of two economic literatures, and advances each of them.
The first is the literature on land assembly in laboratory experiments. This literature finds that the
holdout problem impedes efficient land assembly, but as of yet scholars have not proposed a
workable solution to induce sellers to truthfully reveal their reservation prices. 3 In experiments
without eminent domain, the frequency of sellers making (non)binding requests for more than the
value of their property is high, and sellers earn greater payoffs when they hold out compared to
when they do not (see Cadigan et al., 2009, 2011; Swope, et al., 2011; Collins & Isaac, 2012;
Parente & Winn, 2012; Shupp et al., 2013; Swope et al., 2014; Zillante et al., 2014; Isaac et al.,
2016). 4 Because holding out is not profitable for sellers unless successful land assembly occurs,
the negotiations in these experiments often persist for multiple periods, regardless of whether delay
is costly. In the studies cited above, there were a total of 3,013 negotiations in which land assembly
could fail. Failure occurred in 298 of them for an overall failure rate of 9.9%, though in some
experimental treatments the failure rate exceeded 50%.
The observed market failure raises the possibility that eminent domain can improve
efficiency. However, two laboratory studies have found that eminent domain does not increase

Introducing some competition among the sellers has proved quite effective at reducing holdout in the laboratory,
but this is not a decision variable for most developers or government agencies.

3

4
Recent studies using field data find indirect evidence of seller holdout in land assembly (Cunningham, 2013; Brooks
and Lutz, 2016; Yuming, McMillen, and Somerville, 2016; Portillo, 2017). These studies find that properties that are
redeveloped as part of an assembly sell at a premium over properties that are redeveloped individually. The advantage
of laboratory experiments is their ability to isolate seller holdout as the source of inefficiency, rather than regulatory
frictions, such as zoning restrictions and construction codes.

5

social welfare from land assembly. Kitchens and Roomets (2015) and Winn and McCarter (2018)
both conduct experiments in which buyers can force sales, and the authors compare them to
experiments in which they cannot. Kitchens and Roomets (2015) model the transaction costs of
eminent domain as an exogenous, fixed share of the available surplus, while Winn and McCarter
(2018) model the transaction costs as an endogenous result of the participants’ spending in a court
battle over the price at which a condemned property will trade. In both studies the gains from
trade were statistically indistinguishable across treatments. 5
Thus, the present experimental literature has diagnosed the disease, but has yet to find a
remedy. The current paper advances the conversation by proposing and testing mechanisms that
facilitate high rates of land assembly and gains from trade.
We also contribute to the law and economics literature on self-assessment taxation. Arnold
Harberger (1965) proposed binding self-assessment as a means of taxing the capital value of land
in Latin America. In Harberger’s proposal, a landowner would declare his own assessment of his
property’s value, which the government would use to assess a property tax. Harberger (1965)
suggested that the government could elicit accurate assessments if it forced the landowner to sell
his property to anyone who offered to buy it at a 20% premium over the declared assessment. The
appeal of this scheme was that it would be self-enforcing, avoid corruption and offer accurate
assessments of property values; all of which were a challenge in Latin America. (Harberger did
not advocate self-assessment in nations with well-functioning, comparatively honest political and
economic institutions.)

Cardella and Kitchens (2017) report related research on bargaining in the shadow of eminent domain. They find
that higher variance in the distribution of possible court-determined prices leads sellers to demand more for their
property, resulting in fewer out of court settlements. Increasing the skewness of the distribution has a similar effect.
5
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Over the years, other scholars have recommended self-assessment systems for advanced
economies and offered their own refinements. Levmore (1982) proposes a system of “competitive
assessment” in which private parties may inspect and submit an assessment on a property.
Periodically, the government reveals the highest assessment to the landowner and gives him the
option to sell his property to the assessor or accept the assessment as the taxable value of the
property. Miceli, Segerson and Sirmans (2008) propose a similar system in which a landowner
who rejects a developer’s offer will have the taxable value of his property reassessed at that offer. 6
Bell and Parchomovsky (2007) propose a revision to the eminent domain process in which the
government declares a property it wishes to condemn and the owner is allowed to determine the
price at which such a condemnation must take place. The government may proceed with the
condemnation or relent. If it relents, the owner’s property is reassessed at his declared price and
thereafter he may not sell to any private party at a lower price unless he pays the government a
penalty equal to the difference between the price he declared and the price at which he
subsequently sold. Plassmann and Tideman (2008) propose a tax formula that ensures the marginal
tax rate is always equal to the probability that a developer will wish to purchase the property. We
reproduce their mathematical analysis in Section 3 below to demonstrate that this is a sufficient
condition to make declaring one’s true property value a dominant strategy. 7

DeSantis, McCarter and Winn (2018) test this tax regime with laboratory experiments. They find that reassessing
property taxes at the highest rejected offer increases the rate of land assembly by 58.4% relative to a baseline
treatment in which property taxes are held constant. However, the increase in land assembly did not translate into a
statistically significant increase in gains from trade.
7
The papers cited here focus exclusively on allocative efficiency. Weyl and Zhang (2016, 2018) point out that selfassessment taxes create a tradeoff between allocative efficiency and investment efficiency. To the extent that the
gains in a property’s value will be taxed away, making costly improvements to it would be a waste of the owner’s
money. This is a valuable insight, but in the interests of simplicity we do not include investment in our experimental
design. We leave this facet of self-assessment to future research.
6
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Levmore (1982), Miceli, Segerson and Sirmans (2008), Bell and Parchomovsky (2007)
and Plassman and Tideman (2008) emphasize the usefulness of self-assessment in the real estate
market. Posner and Weyl (2017) make a more radical proposal: implementing self-assessment
taxes (on the Harberger model) on all property, including real estate, internet domain names,
intellectual property and even personal property. As they acknowledge, such a system would
abolish private property as we know it, replacing it with a system of revocable leases. The merits
and demerits of such a system are beyond the scope of this paper, but prudence dictates that selfassessment be tested on a small scale before it can be recommended for all property in general.
Indeed, to our knowledge none of the self-assessment mechanisms – from Harberger on – have
been tested empirically. Taiwan used a self-assessment regime for land from 1954 – 1977. Chang
(2012) shows convincing evidence that landowners substantially understated the value of their
property because the taxes were relatively high, and the government rarely compelled a sale.
(Private citizens could not force one another to sell.) Yet, Chang (2012) does not provide data on
the efficiency of land allocation in this time period or in the years prior to or following it. Thus,
while we know that self-assessments were not accurate, we do not know if the system as a whole
operated with greater, lesser or equal efficiency than the alternative. Indeed, in our experiments
most self-assessments are not “truthful,” but the self-assessment mechanisms still facilitate high
rates of assembly.
3. Self-Assessment Mechanisms
3.1 Incentive Compatible Self-Assessment
In situations where owners face a nonzero probability of a developer seeking to acquire
their property, Plassmann and Tideman (2008) – hereafter PT – propose a mechanism which we
8

refer to as incentive compatible self-assessment (ICSA). Every landowner must declare to the
government a price at which he will voluntarily sell his property. That is, if a developer offers the
owner this price he is obligated to sell. PT assume that the probability that a developer will wish
to buy an owner’s land falls as the declared price increases. They also implicitly assume that the
declared prices of one’s neighbors do not affect this probability. Each owner is assessed a property
tax which is an increasing function of his declared price. The tax is paid by the owner even if his
property is purchased by the developer. PT motivate this mechanism as a type of insurance under
which each landowner pays a premium equal to his expected loss (his private value minus the price
he is forced to accept) multiplied by the tax rate. Just as a fire insurance premium is paid whether
or not there is a fire, the self-assessment tax is paid whether or not the home is purchased. Thus,
as noted by PT, this mechanism “…provides the owner…with assurance that he will receive
compensation for this true loss, rather than an amount that someone else considers ‘reasonable’.” 8
To increase his payoff conditional on selling the owner may report a value above his true
value. However, the owner would then face a higher tax bill. Conversely, suppose the owner
reports a value less than his true value to reduce his tax burden. This would make his property
more appealing to a developer, increasing the probability that the developer will make an offer on
the property – an offer that the owner cannot refuse.
PT show that reporting one’s true value maximizes one’s expected utility under certain
assumptions. Let 𝑥𝑥 be the owner’s declared price and 𝑟𝑟 be his true reservation value. Let 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) be

the probability a developer purchases the owner’s property. As noted above, we assume 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) is
decreasing in 𝑥𝑥, i.e. 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 0. Let 𝑉𝑉 denote the developer’s value and 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) denote the

Note that the ICSA mechanism is distinct from a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. See Plassmann and Tideman
(2008) for an application of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (or Clarke tax) to the land assembly problem.
8
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owner’s tax assessment. Finally, assume the owner is non-risk seeking, with an increasing utility
function 𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋), where 𝜋𝜋 represents the owner’s profit, given by:
𝜋𝜋 = �

𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥), if the owner sells
.
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥), otherwise

The owner’s expected utility is therefore

𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)] = 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑈𝑈�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�𝑈𝑈�𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)�.

(1)

This function is maximized at 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑟𝑟 provided the government sets the marginal tax

rate, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, equal to the probability that a developer will buy the property, 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥). To see that

this is the case, note that the first order condition implied by (1) is:

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)]⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 )�𝑈𝑈�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)� − 𝑈𝑈�𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)��
−𝑈𝑈′�𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)�(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�

+𝑈𝑈′�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)�(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 0.

(2)

Setting 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) simplifies the first order condition (2) into:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)]⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 )�𝑈𝑈�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)� − 𝑈𝑈�𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)��

+[𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)2 ]�𝑈𝑈′�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥)�� = 0

(3)

Notice that if the owner declares a price 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑟𝑟 then 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)]⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 0 and if he declares a price
𝑥𝑥 < 𝑟𝑟 then 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)]⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0. Therefore, a seller can only maximize his expected utility by

declaring his true reservation value. Thus, ICSA mitigates the holdout problem by discouraging
sellers from strategically requesting more for their property than their true value. Moreover, the
properties will only be acquired if a developer’s value for the entire project, 𝑉𝑉, is greater than the
10

sum of the owners’ declared prices. Assuming the owners maximize their utilities by declaring
their true values only efficient projects will proceed. The general form of the tax function is found
by solving the following ordinary differential equation:
𝑥𝑥

yielding

𝑥𝑥

(4)

𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) = ∫0 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(5)

∫0 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = ∫0 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝑥𝑥

where we assume 𝑇𝑇(0) = 0, implying an owner pays nothing if he declares his property to have
zero value.

Unfortunately, ICSA faces two challenges as an implementable policy. First, a key
assumption of the mechanism is that the government is able to accurately gauge (or at least
convince the owners that it can accurately gauge) the probability that a developer will seek to
acquire an owner’s property. Without this information the government cannot set the property tax
formula appropriately to ensure incentive compatibility. Further, estimating the probability
functions for every parcel of land within a jurisdiction would be a costly (if not intractable)
undertaking.
Second, ICSA may encourage proximate landowners to hold out collusively even though
they have no incentive to hold out individually. In a practical setting with multiple owners, it is
probably not realistic to assume that each owner’s probability of selling depends only upon his
declared price. Rather, it is likely that one owner’s probability is dependent on both his declared
price and the declared prices of nearby landowners as well. A straightforward extension of the
ICSA mechanism is possible provided that each owner’s probability of selling and tax burden is

11

dependent upon the declared prices of all owners. Extending the model in this way does not alter
the central result that the owners’ dominant strategy is to truthfully declare their reservation values.
However, the interdependence of the owners’ tax assessments may lead to situations in which
cooperative strategies emerge.
Suppose there are two owners, 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, with reservation values 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 and 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 . Further, suppose

a developer desires these properties and her value for the assembled parcels, 𝑉𝑉, is drawn from a
uniform distribution over the interval [𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵], similar to our experimental design (see Section 4.1).

Then the probability that the sum of the owners’ declared prices, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , is less than 𝑉𝑉 is given

by (𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 )/(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴). 9 Owner 𝑖𝑖’s tax burden is therefore given by
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

𝑇𝑇�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 � = � 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧; 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
=�

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵

0

0

− 𝑧𝑧 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 2
1
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =
��𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −
�
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴
2
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴

(6)

where owner 𝑗𝑗’s declared price is treated as a constant. 10 Note that if owner 𝑗𝑗 increases his declared

price, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , then not only does owner 𝑖𝑖’s probability of sale decrease but his tax burden decreases as

well. Similarly, if owner 𝑖𝑖 increases his declared price then owner j’s probability of sale and tax
burden will both decrease. Thus, cooperative strategies may exist and will depend on the
distribution from which the developer’s value is drawn.
3.2 Simplified Self-Assessment

9

For simplicity, we assume 𝐴𝐴 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐵𝐵 for this example.

The tax burden for owner 𝑗𝑗 is similarly derived by integrating the probability function with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 instead of
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 .

10
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The two shortcomings of ICSA lead us to consider a simplified self-assessment (SSA) tax
mechanism that was proposed by Levmore (1982). SSA is similar to ICSA but with one significant
distinction: the assessed property tax is a fixed percentage of the declared value. This eliminates
the need for the government to estimate the probability functions for each parcel of land. It also
eliminates the collusive holdout strategies because an increase in a neighbor’s declared value does
not decrease the owner’s tax obligation.
Under the SSA tax mechanism 11 an owner would maximize the same expected utility as
given by equation (1) but with 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) set equal to a constant 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 where t is the tax rate:
𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)] = 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�𝑈𝑈(𝑟𝑟 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).

(5)

The first order condition implied by Equation (5) is

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋)]⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 )[𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑈𝑈(𝑟𝑟 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)] + 𝑈𝑈′(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)(1 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)
−𝑈𝑈′(𝑟𝑟 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)� = 0

(6)

which, for a risk-neutral seller implies
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑟𝑟 = −(𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑡𝑡)/(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥)⁄𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑).

Thus, an owner would truthfully reveal his value only if he believed the tax rate was equal to the
probability of an assembler purchasing his property. If an owner believes the flat tax rate is lower
(higher) than the probability of an assembler purchasing his property, then he would be inclined
to declare a value greater than (less than) his reservation value. Thus, while the SSA tax

11

We use the same notation as in Section 3.1.
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mechanism addresses the two drawbacks to the ICSA tax mechanism, it is not generally incentive
compatible.
4. Experiment Design
The ICSA and SSA mechanisms entail two changes to the status quo. First, they eliminate
the need for haggling between the developer and landowners. To aggregate a set of properties the
developer need only visit the tax office and confirm that her maximum willingness-to-pay exceeds
the sum of the self-assessments. Second, it alters the tax code. Under the status quo a landowner’s
tax assessment is unaffected by his decisions in the negotiation; the land is reassessed only upon
sale to the developer. This introduces a tax wedge between the parties that may inhibit assembly.
ICSA and SSA eliminate the tax wedge and impose a cost on the landowners for overstating their
true reservation values.
For this study, we focus our analysis on the second point – alteration of the tax. (We
consider the advantage of allowing assembly without negotiation in Section 6.) To isolate the tax
effect, we conducted experiments for three treatments. Our Ultimatum treatment represents an
intermediate regime between the status quo and self-assessment (ICSA/SSA). In this treatment
property taxes were collected from the holder of the property (at the end of the negotiation), and
the property value was reassessed upon sale. Each landowner submitted an ultimatum price that
the developer could accept or reject, as in a self-assessment regime.

The ICSA treatment

corresponds to PT’s self-assessment mechanism, and the SSA treatment represents a simplified
(and more easily implemented) version of PT’s mechanism. Comparing Ultimatum to ICSA (SSA)
allows us to measure the effect of altering the tax code.
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Our treatment design is shown in Table 1. For each treatment we ran three sessions of
experiments with 10 negotiations per session, giving us 30 negotiations per treatment. Below we
describe the design elements that were common to all three treatments. In subsequent subsections
we describe the design elements that were unique to each treatment.
4.1 Common design elements
In every experiment the participants were partitioned into groups with one developer
(called the buyer) and four landowners (called the sellers). The sellers were assigned values for
their property denominated in Economic Currency Units (ECU), with an exchange rate of 15,500
ECU to one US dollar. The buyer was assigned a value strictly for the combination of all four
properties (not for any individual property). In each treatment the sellers simply declared a price
for their property and the buyer bought the properties if it was profitable to do so given the declared
prices. Since there was no role for strategic decision-making in the buyer’s role, a computer (robot)
served as the buyer.
The sellers’ reservation values were drawn independently with replacement from a discrete
uniform distribution with support [100,000, 150,000] and rounded to the nearest thousand. The
buyer’s value was a number drawn at random from the discrete uniform distribution [300,000,
1,250,000] and rounded to the nearest thousand. Both the buyer’s and sellers’ values were private
information, but the distributions from which they were drawn were common knowledge. 12
The properties all began with an assessed value of 100,000 ECU, the lower bound of the
sellers’ value distribution. This simulates a land market in which the equilibrium price is 100,000

The lower bound of the buyer’s value distribution was less than four times the upper bound of the sellers’ value
distribution, so that there was a nonzero probability that assembling the land would be inefficient. This design element
was necessary to ensure that 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )⁄𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 0 for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 within the range of the sellers’ value distribution.
12
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ECU. All sellers’ values were greater than or equal to this equilibrium price because a seller with
a property worth less to him than the equilibrium price would have already sold it. The assessed
value was the basis for calculating property taxes, which varied in each treatment.
The sellers’ earnings depended on whether they sold their property and the tax regime. A
seller who sold his property to the buyer earned the price at which he sold (minus tax in the ICSA
and SSA treatments). A seller who did not sell his property earned his value for the property (minus
tax in all treatments). We conducted three sessions of experiments for each treatment. In every
session we recruited enough participants for five groups to negotiate simultaneously. After the
first negotiation we partitioned the participants into new groups. No participants who had been
grouped together in the first negotiation were grouped together in the second. We followed this
re-grouping procedure to prevent participants from engaging in repeated game strategies. This
design gives us observations from 30 independent negotiations in each treatment.
Before conducting any experiments, we randomly generated buyer and seller values for 30
negotiations. To make comparisons across treatments as accurate as possible we used the same
value draws for every treatment. These value draws are displayed in Table 2. Of the 30
negotiations, assembly was efficient in 24 (80%). We refer to these as the “positive-sum”
negotiations. In the remaining six (20%) negotiations the properties were more valuable in the
hands of the sellers. The available gains from trade in the positive-sum negotiations ranged
between 5,000 and 765,000 ECU, with an average of 379,000 ECU.
The experiments were facilitated by a graphical software interface which displayed a grid
of four properties, each numbered 1 – 4 with a house icon. On each seller’s screen one of the grid
numbers was highlighted yellow to indicate which property belonged to him. All participants’
screens also displayed their values, the distributions from which the buyer’s and sellers’ values
16

were drawn and their private exchange rate. Sellers could communicate with each other via a text
chat function. Allowing the participants to communicate was an important part of the experimental
design because it gave sellers in the ICSA treatment the best chance of following cooperative
strategies to lower their tax burdens and raise their expected earnings.
4.2 Design Elements of the Ultimatum Treatment
In the Ultimatum treatment, we informed the sellers that a value had been selected
for the buyer in their group and that the computer software would compare their total price plus
10% property tax to that value to determine whether they would sell their properties. Given the
flat tax rate, there was no dominant strategy in the Ultimatum treatment. Assuming there are 𝑁𝑁

risk neutral sellers and the buyer’s value is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [A, B]
(as above), seller 𝑖𝑖 should maximize the following expected utility function
𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 )] =

𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + �1 −
� (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ).
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴

This yields the following first order condition:
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 =

(7)

1
[𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝑡𝑡)𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ]
2(1 + 𝑡𝑡)

which represents seller 𝑖𝑖’s best response to the sum of his neighbors’ declarations, 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 . If seller 𝑖𝑖
believes his neighbors are maximizing the same expected utility function, then his equilibrium
declaration is given by
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ =

𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖
(𝑁𝑁 + 1)(1 + 𝑡𝑡)
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where 𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖 represents the reservation values of seller 𝑖𝑖’s neighbors. 13,14 Note that this best response
function leads sellers to overstate their valuations in our experiments.

Suppose, for example, seller 𝑖𝑖 has a value equal to his expected value of $125,000 and he

assumes his three neighbors’ values are the same as his. Then his optimal declaration would be
$255,455, more than double his true value. If the other three sellers adhered to the same strategy,
then their optimal declarations would be the same as those of seller 𝑖𝑖.

The sellers’ screens in the Ultimatum treatment allowed sellers to submit a price declaration

to the buyer via a “Send Price Declaration” Button. They also were equipped with a graphing tool
to allow the sellers to visualize their expected earnings as a function of their price declaration. A
seller could enter the prices he expected the other three members of his group to declare in text
boxes, then click a button marked “Generate.” The tool generated a line graph with the expected
earnings on the y-axis and the declaration range on the x-axis. The participants could select regions
of the graph to zoom in on. They could also mouse over a point on the curve to see the exact
expected earnings that would occur from a specific declaration.
Negotiations lasted for a single round. For the first 20 minutes of the round the sellers
could communicate with each other through free-form text. The contents of the communication
were saved to a chat log. During this time, they could also explore the expected earnings function
using the graphing tool. After the 20 minutes had elapsed they were prompted to submit a price
declaration. Once all sellers had submitted their price declarations every seller’s declaration was
publicly displayed below his house. If the buyer’s value exceeded the sum of declared prices plus

Refer to Appendix A for details of these derivations.
Note that the equilibrium declaration depends on the other sellers’ values, whereas the best response function
depends upon their declarations.

13
14
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tax, then every house icon turned green as well. If the buyer purchased the land the sellers were
paid their declared prices, otherwise they were paid their values minus 10,000 ECU in property
taxes.
4.3 Design Elements of the ICSA Treatment
The ICSA treatment was identical to Ultimatum except for the assessment of property taxes.
Following PT, in the ICSA treatment we set a seller’s tax function equal to the integral of the
probability function that the buyer would choose to purchase his property, based on his declaration
and the declarations of his neighbors. The probability that the robot buyer would purchase a
seller’s property was equal to the probability that its value draw exceeded the sum of the four
sellers’ declarations. Using the same notation as in Section 4.2, the probability that seller i’s
property will sell given his neighbors’ declarations, 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 , is:
1
𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ) = �
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴
0

if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 < 𝐴𝐴

if 𝐴𝐴 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝐵 .

if 𝐵𝐵 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖

(7)

Taking the integral of (7) and setting the constant term to zero we have the tax function:
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ) = � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑧𝑧; 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
=�

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

0

−1 1 2
� 𝑥𝑥 − (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 )𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 �
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴 2 𝑖𝑖
0

if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 < 𝐴𝐴

if 𝐴𝐴 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝐵 .

if 𝐵𝐵 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖

(8)

Tax function (8) is not wholly satisfactory because if a seller offers a declaration greater
than 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 he can unilaterally reduce his tax burden to zero. This is because the probability of
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sale is non-decreasing in 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 once the sum of all declarations exceeds the upper bound of the buyer’s

value distribution. We addressed this by defining a maximum declaration that was dependent on
the declarations of the other sellers: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 . If seller i submitted a declaration 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 > 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ , then

we used 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ to calculate his tax (though 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 was still used for the total price presented to the robot
buyer).

Also note that if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 < 𝐴𝐴 then the probability that the buyer would purchase the properties

is equal to 1, and the integral of this region of the probability function would imply a tax equal to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . In

this case the tax would exactly equal the price the seller was paid for his property, leaving him with a payoff

of zero. Thus, the sellers would have no incentive to collusively understate their values. To simplify the

description of the tax function for our participants, we used the following tax function:
−1 1 2
� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + (𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 )𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 �
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ) = � 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴 2
−1 1 ∗ 2
� 𝑥𝑥 + (𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 )𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ �
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴 2 𝑖𝑖

if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖

if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖

.

(9)

Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical tax function (8) as well as the implemented tax function
(9).

The graph assumes that the buyer’s value range is [300,000, 1,250,000] – as in our

experiments – and seller i’s neighbors’ declarations are equal to zero. Notice that within the
buyer’s value range the functions are identical. Above the upper bound of the buyer’s value range
the theoretical tax falls to zero, while the implemented tax function is constant, ensuring that
participants could not unilaterally eliminate their own taxes. Below the lower bound of the buyer’s
value range the implemented tax function assesses a higher tax than the theoretical one. Thus,
under both tax functions sellers have no incentive to collusively set the total price below the lower
bound of the buyer’s value distribution. Because of the complexity of the property tax formula we
added the ability to graph the tax formula to the sellers’ graphing tool. A drop-down menu allowed
20

them to choose whether to graph the expected earnings or property taxes. Figure 2 provides closeup images of the graphing tool in the ICSA treatment.
The sellers received their price declarations if the buyer purchased the properties and
received their values otherwise. In either case they paid the assessment tax. As a result, there was
no tax wedge between the total price declared by the sellers and the price paid by the robot buyer.
In our experiments each seller’s declaration could have a large impact on the probability of
assembly, so the equilibrium assessment taxes were very high. For instance, in a group where all
four sellers’ values were 125,000 ECU and they truthfully declared these values, the assessment
tax would be roughly 106,700 ECU per seller, so that each would earn approximately 18,300 ECU.
Notice, however, that tax function (9) is decreasing in 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 , which created room for tax

avoidance through collusive holdout. In the extreme, if 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝐵𝐵 then seller i would pay no tax,

because the probability of assembly would be zero regardless of his declaration. Thus, if each of
the four sellers agreed to declare a price greater than or equal to one third of the upper bound of
the buyer’s value distribution then the sellers would all keep their property and pay no tax,
capturing the full consumption value of their land: 125,000 ECU. This would be almost 600%
higher than their earnings from truthfully declaring their values. The high potential earnings from
collusion make these experiments a formidable stress test of the ICSA mechanism. 15 Allowing

the sellers to communicate gave them the best chance of coordinating on such a strategy.
4.4 Design Elements of the SSA Treatment

In our experiments the cooperation of only four sellers was necessary for successful collusion. It is possible that
collusion would be more difficult to achieve for a large number of sellers. Thus, our design stress tests ICSA not only
in the incentives to collude but in the ease of doing so.
15
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The basic features of the SSA experiments were the same as those of the ICSA experiments.
The only distinction is that the assessment tax was 10% of the seller’s price declaration, as in
Ultimatum. Consequently, there was no dominant strategy in the SSA treatment. Assuming there
are 𝑁𝑁 risk neutral sellers and the buyer’s value is drawn from a uniform distribution with support

[A, B] (as above), seller 𝑖𝑖 should maximize the expected utility function:
𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 )] =

𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + �1 −
� (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ).
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴

This yields the following first order condition:
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 =

(7)

𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴) + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
2

which represents seller 𝑖𝑖’s best response to the sum of his neighbors’ declarations, 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 . If seller 𝑖𝑖
believes his neighbors are maximizing the same expected utility function, then his equilibrium
declaration is given by
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ =

𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴) + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁 + 1

where 𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖 represents the reservation values of seller 𝑖𝑖’s neighbors. 16,17 Note that this best response
function leads sellers to overstate their valuations in our experiments.

Suppose, for example, seller 𝑖𝑖 has a value equal to his expected value of $125,000 and he

assumes his three neighbors’ values are the same as his. Then his optimal declaration would be

Refer to Appendix A for details of these derivations.
Similar to the Ultimatum treatment, note that the equilibrium declaration depends on the other sellers’ values,
whereas the best response function depends upon their declarations.

16
17
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$256,000, more than double his true value. If the other three sellers adhered to the same strategy,
then their optimal declarations would be the same as those of seller 𝑖𝑖.

To allow the participants to earn the same amount in the ICSA and SSA treatments as in the

Ultimatum treatment while keeping their exchange rates the same, we made the taxes revenue
neutral by redistributing all self-assessed taxes back to the sellers in the form of a bonus.
Specifically, the taxes from one group were divided evenly and paid to the sellers of another group.
Communication across groups was not allowed, so the bonus payments were exogenous from the
recipient’s perspective.
4.5 Expected Earnings in the Three Treatments
As noted in the Sections 4.2 – 4.4, declaring a price equal to one’s reservation value was
the Nash Equilibrium in the ICSA treatment, while declaring a price above value was the Nash
Equilibrium in the Ultimatum and SSA treatments. In Table 3 we illustrate the effect on expected
earnings with a numerical example. For each treatment we assume that all sellers’ values are
125,000 ECU and that the seller’s counterparts declare prices equal to the Nash Equilibrium given
the treatment. We calculated the seller’s expected earnings from declaring prices equal to value
and 25,000 ECU above and below value, displayed in the top three rows. We also calculated the
seller’s expected earnings from declaring the Nash Equilibrium price, shown in the fourth row.
Notice that declaring a price below value is strictly dominated in all treatments. In ICSA,
declaring a price 25,000 ECU above value is also dominated, reducing the seller’s payoff by 329
ECU. In Ultimatum and SSA overstating the value by 25,000 would increase the seller’s payoff
by 6,829 ECU and 6,242 ECU respectively. Declaring the Nash Equilibrium price in Ultimatum
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and SSA would increase the seller’s payoff by 19,705 ECU and 18,087 ECU relative to truthful
declarations.
4.6 Procedures
All experiments were conducted at a university in the American Southwest. We randomly
recruited a total of 180 participants (60 for each treatment) from an online database of
approximately 1,500 volunteers. All participants were undergraduate or graduate students, and
none participated in more than one session.
Before the experiment, participants were ushered into a computer laboratory and seated at
stations separated by privacy dividers. One of the experimenters read the instructions aloud from
a script, pausing at pre-determined points to answer questions. Screenshots of the user interface
were projected on the screen at the front of the room. 18 After completing the instructions, onepage summary sheets of the instructions were distributed to the participants. Copies of the
instructions, screenshots and summary sheets may be found in online appendices A, B, and C.
After the first negotiation an experimenter entered the lab to remind the participants that in
the second negotiation they would be put in new groups that did not have any of their counterparts
from the first negotiation. After the second negotiation the participants were paid in cash one by
one. They received $7 for attending the experiment in addition to payment based on their
decisions. The average participant earnings were $21.72 including the attendance bonus. The
typical session lasted 90 minutes.
5. Results

18

The instructions included a discussion of expected value so that the participants would understand the purpose of
the graphing tool. We also showed the participants two short video clips on how to use the graphing tool.
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To assess the impact of the different tax mechanisms on the land assembly problem, we
consider three measures: seller premiums, assembly rates, and social welfare. Previewing the
results, we find that seller premiums are significantly lower in ICSA than in SSA or Ultimatum.
We do not find any significant differences between the treatments with respect to rates of assembly.
And, finally, while more surplus is captured by the self-assessment mechanisms than the status
quo, the difference between ICSA and SSA is not significant.
5.1 Seller Premiums
We begin by examining the amount sellers demanded in excess of their induced values.
We refer to this amount as the seller premium. The seller premium gives us a measure of the
frictions to assembly that buyers faced that can be compared across treatments. We measure the
seller premiums by subtracting the sellers’ values from their price declarations. Given ICSA’s
incentive compatibility the theoretical seller premium for this treatment is zero. In the Ultimatum
treatment the buyer paid a 10% property tax assessed on the prices they had paid the sellers for
their property. This put a tax wedge between the prices paid by the buyers and the prices received
by the sellers. Thus, in Ultimatum the seller premiums must be tax-adjusted by adding the property
tax a buyer would have to pay upon successful assembly.
Figure 3 displays the average seller premium for each treatment with gray columns and
standard error bars. In the ICSA treatment there was a single group that collusively overstated
their values to eliminate their tax burden. Three of the sellers in this group self-assessed at 1
million ECU, the fourth self-assessed at 1.25 million ECU. In Figure 3 we display two average
premiums for the ICSA treatment: one including this group and one trimming it from the dataset
as an outlier. When the outlier group is included, the average seller premium is more than 69,000
ECU, the highest of any treatment. Excluding this group reduces the average premium to less than
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38,000 ECU – the lowest of any treatment – and reduces the standard error by almost 80%. We
believe that the trimmed average better reflects the frictions to assembly that a developer would
expect to face. Notice, however, that in either case the average is well above zero.
The average (tax-adjusted) seller premiums in the Ultimatum and SSA treatments are quite
similar to each other, approximately 58,000 ECU and 52,000 ECU. However, both are at least
14,000 ECU (37%) greater than the average trimmed ICSA seller premium, and their standard error
bars do not overlap with trimmed ICSA error bars.
To test for treatment effects, we fit the data to a regression model with the (tax-adjusted)
seller premium as the dependent variable. The independent variables were dummy variables
indicating whether the seller was in the ICSA or SSA treatment, the negotiation number and the
seller’s value. We also included random effects for each seller. We fit the model once to the full
data sample and a second time omitting the four sellers who had submitted assessments of 1 million
ECU or more. Sellers within a group likely influenced one another’s decisions, so we clustered
the standard errors by group. The estimates are displayed in Table 4.
Fitting our model to the full data sample we find no treatment effects. The estimated effect
of the ICSA mechanism is an 11,129 ECU increase in seller premiums relative to Ultimatum, but
the estimate is not statistically significant (p = 0.498). The SSA mechanism is estimated to reduce
the seller premium by 5,693 ECU, but this estimate is also statistically insignificant (p = 0.499).
A Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients for ICSA and SSA are
equal (p = 0.289).
When we trim the outlier group, however, significant differences appear between ICSA and
the other two mechanisms. The estimated tax-adjusted seller premium for Ultimatum – reflected
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in the constant term – is $111,428 (p < 0.001). The estimated effect of the ICSA mechanism is a
reduction in the seller premium of 19,178 ECU, or 17.2%. This estimate is statistically significant
(p = 0.011).

The estimated coefficient for the SSA treatment is negative but statistically

insignificant (p = 0.497). However, a Wald test rejects the equality of the coefficients for the ICSA
and SSA treatments (p = 0.031), so we may conclude that seller premiums were significantly lower
in ICSA than in SSA. Notice also that the model estimates a negative and statistically significant
coefficient on the sellers’ values (p = 0.019), indicating that sellers with higher values demanded
smaller premiums.
Why did sellers’ assessments exceed their true values in the ICSA treatment? Collusive
holdout could increase their profits because it allowed them to mutually reduce their tax burdens.
However, a review of the chat logs in the ICSA sessions indicates that very few of them fully
understood this. Participants discussed the tax benefits of collusion in only three of the 30 groups,
and only one of these realized that they could pay zero taxes by holding out for more than the
buyer’s maximum value. Instead, most sellers seemed to take it for granted that the purpose of
holding out was to sell at a price above their values, and they sought to avoid declaring prices so
high that the buyer would reject their offers. The most common strategy that sellers discussed in
the ICSA treatment was to coordinate a total price that was less than the buyer’s expected value,
so that the chances of success exceeded 50%.
5.2 Assembly
Figure 4 displays the rate of assembly by treatment in the positive-sum negotiations. In
the Ultimatum treatment the buyers were able to acquire all four properties in 70.8% (17 of 24) of
these negotiations. The assembly rate was 83.3% (20 of 24) in both the ICSA and SSA treatments.
We tested for statistical significance with a logistic regression. The independent variable was a
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dummy indicating assembly (1 = success, 0 = failure). The independent variables were dummy
variables for the ICSA and SSA treatments, the negotiation number and the amount of available
surplus (scaled in 10,000 ECU). We limited the dataset to those observations where the available
surplus was positive. The results are displayed in Table 5.
The estimated coefficients for both treatment dummies are positive but statistically
insignificant (p = 0.203 in both cases). We cannot be confident that self-assessment taxation
improved the assembly rate in our experiments. The model does indicate that assembly was more
likely in negotiations in which more surplus was available. The estimated coefficient for the
available surplus is positive and highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). This finding is
encouraging because it indicates that holdout is less of a barrier when the development in question
is of high value (provided the value is sufficiently uncertain from the sellers’ perspective). The
marginal effect is substantial for the Ultimatum treatment, but moderate for the ICSA and SSA
treatments. If we set the available surplus to the observed mean (379,000 ECU) and assume that
the participants are in their first negotiation, then an increase in available surplus of 10,000 ECU
increases the probability of assembly by 1.6 percentage points in Ultimatum and 0.6 percentage
points in ICSA and SSA.
5.3 Social Welfare
The customary measure of social welfare in laboratory experiments is efficiency, the
earnings that the participants received divided by the maximum earnings they could have received.
However, this measure has two shortcomings for our experiments. First, the participants were
guaranteed to earn a certain amount regardless of their decisions, which inflates the measure.
Second, the negotiations varied in the gains from trade that were available. Capturing 80% of
1,000,000 ECU generates more social welfare than capturing 100% of 10,000 ECU but dividing
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the achieved earnings by the maximum earnings treats the latter as a better outcome. Thus, we
measure the social welfare as the gains from trade, or surplus, captured in the negotiation.
To calculate the surplus, we subtracted the earnings that the participants would have
received if the buyer had never made an offer from their earnings at the end of the negotiation.
We include the robot buyer’s earnings in the calculated surplus. Across the 24 positive-sum
negotiations there was a maximum available surplus of 9,096,000 ECU, with an average of
379,000 per negotiation.

Figure 5 shows the average surplus per positive-sum negotiation

achieved in each treatment, with standard error bars. (No negative-sum assemblies occurred in
our experiments.)
In Ultimatum the participants gained approximately 310,000 ECU per negotiation, 82% of
the available surplus. Gains from trade were higher under self-assessed taxation. Participants in
ICSA improved their earnings by almost 350,000 ECU per negotiation, or 92% of the available
surplus. SSA saw the highest average surplus, nearly 371,000 per negotiation. That is, in the SSA
treatment the participants captured nearly 98% of the available surplus.
We tested the statistical significance of these results with an OLS regression. The variance
of available surplus was large across negotiations. The minimum available surplus was 5,000
ECU, the maximum was 765,000 ECU. To remove this noise from the data, for each negotiation
in the ICSA and SSA treatments we normalized the observed surplus by subtracting out the surplus
captured in the equivalent negotiation in the Ultimatum treatment. Let 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 represent the surplus

captured in negotiation n of treatment 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆} and 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 represent the surplus captured in

negotiation n of the Ultimatum treatment. Then normalized surplus equals 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 . 19 After
We also analyzed the surplus captured by buyers vs. sellers in each treatment. The results of this analysis are in
Appendix B.
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calculating these differences for all negotiations we test whether they are statistically different
from zero with a regression model using normalized surplus as the dependent variable and
including treatment dummies and the negotiation number as the independent variables. We held
the regression constant fixed at zero to avoid perfect collinearity with the treatment dummies and
to simplify their interpretation. Table 6 contains the estimates.
The results of the model indicate that participants captured more surplus under selfassessed taxation than in the Ultimatum treatment in their first negotiation, but not in their second.
The estimated coefficients for ICSA and SSA are both positive and statistically significant (p =
0.036 and p = 0.020 respectively). The estimated effect of the negotiation number is negative,
marginally statistically significant (p = 0.072) and roughly half the magnitude of the treatment
dummies. If we set the negotiation number equal to one, the model estimates that participants
generated 85,875 ECU more per negotiation in ICSA than in Ultimatum. An F-test of the
hypothesis that the sum of the ICSA and negotiation number coefficients sum to zero falls just
short of statistical significance at the 5% level (p = 0.051). Keeping the negotiation number equal
to one, the model estimates that in the SSA treatment the participants generated 106,875 more per
negotiation than in Ultimatum. This estimate is significant at the 5% level (F-test, p = 0.016).
However, if we set the negotiation number equal to two then the estimated differences between
the Ultimatum treatment and self-assessment treatments are -5,458 (ICSA) and 15,542 (SSA).
Neither of these estimates is statistically significant (F-tests, p > 0.7 in both cases). Additionally,
an F-test of the self-assessment treatment dummies cannot reject equality (p = 0.673), indicating
that ICSA and SSA were equally effective at increasing gains from trade.
The gain in surplus relative to Ultimatum is due in part to the fact that there were more
assemblies in the ICSA and SSA treatments. But in addition to that, many of the extra assemblies
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occurred in negotiations with substantial available surplus. Table 7 displays the available gains
from assembly for each negotiation and indicates whether assembly occurred in each treatment.
The negotiations are rank-ordered from highest available gains from assembly to lowest. There
were 17 successful assemblies in Ultimatum, generating a total surplus of 7,430,000 ECU. If we
look at the 17 highest-surplus assemblies in the ICSA treatment they generated total gains from
trade of 7,926,000 ECU. In the SSA treatment the top 17 assemblies generated 8,032,000 ECU of
surplus.
5.4 Robustness Checks Using Synthetic Treatments
Our experimental results on assembly rates and gains from trade are due in part to the “luck
of the draw.” When the sellers in our experiments submitted their price declarations they did not
know what value had been drawn for the buyer. There were cases in which a group of sellers
asked for barely more or less than the buyer’s value. For instance, one group in the Ultimatum
treatment set a total (tax-adjusted) price of 990,000 ECU when the buyer’s value was 960,000
ECU. A group in the ICSA treatment set a total price of 819,000 ECU when the buyer’s value was
832,000 ECU. There were also cases in which total prices with a high ex ante probability of being
below the buyer’s value draw turned out to be above it, and vice versa. One group in the ICSA
treatment asked for a total of 568,000 ECU, which had a 72% probability of being less than the
buyer’s value. The value turned out to be 507,000. A group in the SSA treatment asked for a total
of 900,000 ECU, which had only a 37% probability of being less than the buyer’s value. In a
stroke of good luck, the actual value draw was 1,172,000 ECU.
Given the role chance played in our results, we test the robustness of our findings by
considering what the results would have been with different sets of value draws for the robot
buyers. We conducted a series of 10,000 simulated sessions for each treatment. In a given
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simulation, we drew 30 new values for the robot buyer independently from the uniform distribution
[300,000, 1,250,0000], rounding to the nearest thousand. We then compared the sellers’ total (taxadjusted) prices to the new values, recording whether or not an assembly would have occurred, the
gains from trade (if any), and the amount of surplus captured by the buyer and sellers. To keep
the results as comparable as possible across treatments, we compared the total prices from a given
negotiation in each treatment to the same value draw. Because the simulations combined real
human decisions with simulated value draws, we refer to them as synthetic treatments. The
synthetic treatments allow us to observe the results that would occur from the sellers’ decisions if
the role of chance were averaged out through very large sample sizes.
For the synthetic treatments the unit of observation is not at the level of the negotiation,
but rather at the level of the simulation, i.e. all 30 negotiations with new buyer value draws. There
are three primary metrics of interest for each synthetic treatment. These are the percent of positivesum negotiations that resulted in assembly (i.e., the “efficient assembly rate”), the percent of
negative-sum negotiations that resulted in assembly (i.e., the “inefficient assembly rate”), and the
total surplus per simulation. 20 We compared treatments on their performance on these metrics
using pair-wise Mann-Whitney U tests. The z-statistics for each comparison are presented in Table
8. Note that there are only two comparisons for which the null hypotheses cannot be rejected with
95% confidence: the inefficient assembly rate of the Ultimatum and ICSA treatments (p = 0.780)
and the total surplus of the ICSA and SSA treatments (p = 0.893). For all other comparisons the
null is rejected with greater than 99.9% confidence (p < 0.001 in all cases).

Two additional metrics, buyer surplus per simulation and seller surplus per simulation, are considered in
Appendix B.
20
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The sizes of the observed effects are also of interest, particularly since the effects are almost
all statistically significant. We measured effect sizes with Cohen’s d, dividing the difference
between two synthetic treatments’ means by their pooled standard deviation. We use the effect
size cutoffs suggested by Cohen (1988) and Sawilowsky (2009). That is, d > 1.2 implies a very
large effect size, d > 0.8 a large effect size, d > 0.5 medium and d > 0.2 small. A d < 0.2 implies
a very small effect size. Table 9 displays the Cohen’s d values for every pair-wise comparison of
our three metrics. We will refer to the values in Table 9 in our discussion below.
Figure 6 displays the average efficient assembly rates for the three synthetic treatments.
The performance in all the synthetic treatments is lower than in the experiments: 68.8% in
Ultimatum, 76.3% in ICSA and 72.0% in SSA. Notice also that the difference in efficient assembly
is smaller in the synthetic treatments than it was in the experiments. Still, each treatment is
statistically significantly different from the other two. The effect size between Ultimatum and
ICSA is large (d = 0.84), while the effect size between Ultimatum and SSA is small (d = 0.34).
Figure 7 displays the average inefficient assembly rates for the synthetic treatments. There
were no inefficient assemblies in our experiments, but with a sufficient number of simulations
there were a small number of such assemblies in the synthetic Ultimatum and ICSA treatments. In
each of these the inefficient assembly rate was 0.6%, and these are statistically indistinguishable.
There were no inefficient assemblies in the synthesized SSA, which is statistically significantly
lower than the other synthetic treatments. The effect size is small between Ultimatum and SSA (d
= 0.27) and between ICSA and SSA (d = 0.26).
The average gains from trade in the synthetic treatments are displayed in Figure 8. Note
that the gains from trade were almost identical in the ICSA and SSA treatments (8.04 million ECU
vs. 8.05 million ECU). Even though the efficient assembly rate was higher in the synthetic ICSA
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treatment than in synthetic SSA, the inefficient assembly rate was lower in synthetic SSA. These
two effects counterbalanced each other, leading to parity in gains from trade. Both synthetic selfassessment treatments captured more gains from trade than the synthetic Ultimatum treatment, but
the difference is not large. The effect size between the synthetic Ultimatum and ICSA treatments
is very small (d = 0.16), as is the effect size between the synthetic Ultimatum and SSA treatments
(d = 0.17). If we compare the realized gains from trade to the maximum gains available, the
synthetic Ultimatum earned 87% of the available gains on average, while the synthetic ICSA and
SSA both earned 90%.
6. Our Results in the Context of the Experimental Land Assembly Literature
The results of our experiments and simulations do not show a large improvement in
assembly and social welfare from self-assessment mechanisms relative to ultimatum bargaining.
However, developers are more likely to pursue land assembly through an iterative negotiation
process with landowners. Thus, it is worth comparing the results reported here to those of other
studies in the experimental land assembly literature that use negotiation rather than ultimatum
offers. We will focus on two studies: DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2019) and Collins & Isaac
(2012).
The study by DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2019) is most directly comparable to the present
study because both use the same experimental environment: a single buyer, four sellers and values
drawn from the same distributions. In fact, we used precisely the same value draws in both studies
and gave them to the participants in the same order. The only difference is in the bargaining
institution. We will focus in particular on the Baseline treatment discussed in DeSantis, McCarter
& Winn (2019).
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In the Baseline the role of buyer was played by a human participant, not a robot. The buyer
and sellers negotiated for up to five periods. Each period began with the sellers submitting
nonbinding price requests to the buyer. The buyer then either aborted the negotiation or sent
binding offers to the sellers, which they could accept or reject. If at least one seller rejected his
offer negotiations continued to the next round. (Before submitting their price requests and before
accepting or rejecting the buyer’s offers the sellers were allowed to communicate with each other
via text chat. Communication between buyers and sellers was restricted to the price requests and
offers.) If a seller accepted the buyer’s offer the sale occurred even if other sellers had rejected
their offers. That is, contracts were non-contingent.
The tax framework was the same as in Ultimatum. Sellers owed 10,000 ECU in tax if they
kept their property, but owed no tax if they sold. Buyers owed 10% of the prices they paid if they
assembled all four properties. If the negotiations ended and the buyer had assembled fewer than
four properties, she sold them back to the experimenter for 100,000 ECU each, and paid no tax.
The buyer started each negotiation with 350,000 in cash that served as an opportunity cost
to negotiation. Delay was costly to the buyer, but not the sellers. The buyer had an earnings
multiplier that started at 100%. The multiplier was reduced to 95% if the buyer failed to assemble
all properties by the end of period one, 90% if she failed to assemble them by the end of period
two, etc. This multiplier was applied to the buyer’s cash on hand and – if assembly was achieved
– her induced value for assembly.
Efficient assembly was just 50% in the Baseline treatment, considerably less than in any
of the treatments we conducted for the present study. Because the economic environment was the
same in both studies, we can compare our treatments to the Baseline with a logistic regression,
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controlling for negotiation number and available surplus, as in Section 5.2 above. The omitted
treatment dummy is Baseline.
The results are displayed in Table 10. Both ICSA and SSA have positive, statistically
significant coefficients (p = 0.006 in both cases), indicating that self-assessment is effective in
increasing land assembly relative to bilateral bargaining with non-contingent contracts and costly
delay. The estimated coefficient for Ultimatum is positive but it is only marginally statistically
significant (p = 0.075) and is not statistically significantly different than the ICSA or SSA
coefficients (Wald test, p = 0.198 in both cases). Thus, the efficient assembly rate appears to be
intermediate under ultimatum offers, relative to negotiation and self-assessment.
The use of a human buyer by DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2019) constitutes an
uncontrolled variable when comparing the outcomes in the Baseline to the treatments in the present
study, so these results should be interpreted with caution. Still, it is worth noting that adopting a
self-assessment regime would put developers in a position to move forward with projects that
would be profitable given the landowners’ assessments. Under such circumstances – particularly
where there is robust competition among developers – we would expect human developers to
operate on the same principle as our robot buyers, assembling any group of properties that offers
a positive economic profit.
We now turn to Collins & Isaac (2012). Like DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2019), their
experiments also consisted of a single buyer negotiating with four sellers. The sellers’ values were
drawn independently in cents from a uniform distribution with support [100, 300]. The buyer’s
value was equal to the sum of the sellers’ values plus a random number of cents drawn at random
from a uniform distribution with support [300, 1,100]. Offers were made by the buyer to the
sellers, who chose to accept or reject. However, the buyer could communicate with the sellers via
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text chat. The sellers could also communicate with each other via text chat. The participants had
12 minutes to negotiate. Unlike DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2019), Collins & Isaac (2012)
imposed no delay cost on the buyer, but did not allow her to sell properties back to the experimenter
if she assembled fewer than four.
Collins & Isaac (2012) studied two treatment variables. The first was whether the buyer
was operating under a capital constraint. In the capital constraint treatment, the buyer had 740
cents in working capital that limited the prices she could offer the sellers. Specifically, the buyer
could spend no more than 740 cents on acquiring the first three properties. Once the third property
was acquired, the capital constraint was removed and she could offer the remaining seller a price
up to her assembly value minus the prices she had already paid. In the contingent contracts
treatment the buyer did not actually pay any of the sellers unless and until all four of them had
accepted her offers. The buyer still started with 740 cents in cash, but it did not limit her offers.
The second treatment variable was whether the buyer’s value for assembly, working capital and
the number of completed contracts was known only to the buyer or was public information
available to all participants. This treatment variable had no impact on the assembly rate, so we
pool the results, focusing only on whether or not there was a capital constraint.
Collins & Isaac (2012) report that in their capital constrained negotiations, the buyer was
successful in approximately 46% of negotiations, while buyers who had access to contingent
contracts were successful in almost 94% of negotiations. Recall that the efficient assembly rate in
our self-assessment treatments was 83.3%. This is an improvement of 81% relative to their capital
constrained negotiations, and only 11% below their contingent contracts negotiation.
A pessimistic read of the evidence may lead one to question the utility of self-assessment,
as it has a lower assembly rate than contingent contracts in laboratory experiments. However, it
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is important to note that self-assessment does not preclude negotiation between developers and
landowners. Rather, it establishes a maximum price that developers may pay if they choose to
forego negotiation, or if negotiation fails. A developer who faces neither a capital constraint nor
significant delay costs may treat the self-assessed prices as the landowners’ opening offer and try
to bargain them down to a lower price. (The fact that most of our sellers’ self-assessments
exceeded their value suggests that this approach would be profitable.) On the other hand, a
developer who faces high costs from delay could pay the self-assessed prices and avoid
negotiation. Similarly, capital constraints would be of little practical importance if the developer
could calculate the total price of assembly ex ante and take this figure to a bank or credit markets.
Thus, self-assessment would reduce the transaction costs of delay and capital constraints in
precisely those circumstances where they are barriers to assembly.
7. Conclusion
We tested the ability of two self-assessment mechanisms to facilitate land assembly by
comparing them to a variant of the status quo (eminent domain). In particular, we designed our
experiments to focus on the effect of each mechanism’s tax function. Although our baseline,
Ultimatum, did not allow for bilateral negotiation, it did utilize the status quo’s tax mechanism,
thus enabling our analyses. Self-assessment increased assembly by 12.5 percentage points and
gains from trade by 10 – 16 percentage points relative to ultimatum bargaining. However, the first
effect is statistically insignificant and the second is transitory. On the other hand, prior studies by
Collins & Isaac (2012) and DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2019) have found that when buyers face
negotiating frictions – such as capital constraints or costly delay – the rate of assembly is 50% or
less. In our self-assessment treatments the efficient assembly rate was 83.3%, a substantial
improvement.
38

Implementing ICSA in the field would require substantial effort and resources to estimate
the sale probability functions for every piece of land in a jurisdiction. Moreover, if landowners in
that jurisdiction did not trust that the government had accurately estimated the probability
functions then the mechanism may not be as effective in the field as in our laboratory. In contrast,
SSA would be straightforward to implement, and – in our experimental environment – delivers a
similar rate of assembly and level of gains from trade.
Certain aspects of self-assessment may raise popular objections that could make its
implementation politically difficult. Landowners may be reluctant to accept a tax regime in which
they may owe tax on a property for some period even after selling it. Still, this would affect a
relatively small number of owners in a given year, and it may be mitigated by selling property on
or near the date that a new declaration is due or incorporating the leftover tax payment into the
sale price of the property. Another objection may be the risk that any private citizen may exercise
a purchase option on another’s property at any time. This may be addressed by restricting the right
to purchase to the municipal, state and federal governments. Whatever the political viability of
self-assessment may be, it is our hope that the performance of these mechanisms in the laboratory
will spur more research into alternatives to eminent domain. There may be other mechanisms yet
untested that satisfy the dual constraints of economic efficiency and political palatability.
Beyond the discussion of eminent domain, our findings contribute to the conversation
about the tragedy of the anti-commons, of which the land assembly problem is a special case. In
an anti-commons dilemma, multiple agents own separate inputs to a valuable output (Heller,
1998). The veto power of multiple agents can hinder economic efficiency. Anti-commons
scholars submit that structural solutions – those that often require a superordinate authority to
coordinate – provide a necessary means for navigating such land social dilemmas (e.g., Heller,
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2008). Our results demonstrate that there are (at least) two structural solutions to the tragedy of
the anti-commons in land assembly. Posner and Weyl (2017) have argued that such structural
solutions should be applied to all goods and services generally, and the findings we present may
be taken as evidence in their support. A fruitful direction for future research would be to test selfassessment in other markets, such as electromagnetic spectrum and personal property. This would
allow scholars to identify the limits (if any) of self-assessment as a means of improving social
welfare.
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Table 1. Treatment Design
Treatment

Sessions

Negotiations
per Session

Total
Negotiations

Ultimatum

3

10

30

Incentive Compatible Self-Assessment (ICSA)

3

10

30

Simplified Self-Assessment (ICSA)

3

10

30

Total:

9
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90

Table 2. Buyer and Seller Values in ECU
Session

Negotiation

Group

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

Buyer Value
815,000
312,000
1,201,000
363,000
832,000
1,224,000
950,000
816,000
391,000
663,000
768,000
507,000
828,000
555,000
1,051,000
499,000
524,000
870,000
902,000
1,172,000
686,000
870,000
960,000
444,000
953,000
884,000
417,000
1,144,000
871,000
902,000

Seller 1
Value
109,000
135,000
125,000
107,000
146,000
102,000
114,000
124,000
135,000
145,000
121,000
142,000
142,000
142,000
121,000
140,000
120,000
132,000
103,000
131,000
100,000
139,000
128,000
106,000
135,000
144,000
142,000
147,000
102,000
139,000

Seller 2
Value
147,000
126,000
128,000
147,000
136,000
119,000
123,000
119,000
100,000
104,000
102,000
113,000
106,000
136,000
120,000
129,000
148,000
147,000
106,000
112,000
100,000
135,000
125,000
123,000
125,000
116,000
113,000
120,000
148,000
115,000
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Seller 3
Value
102,000
145,000
132,000
132,000
104,000
122,000
127,000
108,000
118,000
144,000
117,000
105,000
123,000
109,000
102,000
147,000
124,000
132,000
122,000
134,000
113,000
145,000
130,000
141,000
147,000
113,000
150,000
135,000
135,000
102,000

Seller 4
Value
110,000
106,000
101,000
124,000
109,000
116,000
147,000
128,000
121,000
138,000
143,000
142,000
116,000
116,000
138,000
117,000
124,000
111,000
126,000
114,000
128,000
109,000
139,000
122,000
105,000
109,000
125,000
122,000
128,000
103,000

Total Seller
Value
468,000
512,000
486,000
510,000
495,000
459,000
511,000
479,000
474,000
531,000
483,000
502,000
487,000
503,000
481,000
533,000
516,000
522,000
457,000
491,000
441,000
528,000
522,000
492,000
512,000
482,000
530,000
524,000
513,000
459,000

Gains from
Assembly
347,000
(200,000)
715,000
(147,000)
337,000
765,000
439,000
337,000
(83,000)
132,000
285,000
5,000
341,000
52,000
570,000
(34,000)
8,000
348,000
445,000
681,000
245,000
342,000
438,000
(48,000)
441,000
402,000
(113,000)
620,000
358,000
443,000

Table 3. Expected earnings from various price declarations. All participants are assumed to
have a reservation value of 125,000 ECU and the seller’s counterparts are assumed to play the
Nash Equilibrium. Nash Equilibrium bids are 255,455 ECU (Ultimatum), 125,000 ECU (ICSA)
and 256,000 ECU (SSA).
Seller’s
Expected Earnings
Declaration Ultimatum ICSA
SSA
100,000
108,943
17,763 104,749
125,000
117,219
18,092 112,306
150,000
124,048
17,763 118,548
Nash
136,924
18,092 130,393
Equilibrium
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Table 4. Estimates from random effects regression on seller premiums. (Premiums are taxadjusted in the Ultimatum treatment.)
Full Sample

Trimmed Sample

Variable

Coefficient
Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
*
Constant
126,976
111,428***
(51,968)
(23,111)
ICSA Treatment
11,129
-19,178*
(16,427)
(7,549)
SSA Treatment
-5,693
-5,693
(8,422)
(8,387)
†
Negotiation Number
20,050
-522
(11,065)
(4,012)
Seller’s Value
-0.798†
-0.425*
(0.450)
(0.181)
Observations
360
356
Overall R2
0.025
0.041
Wald χ2
7.03
16.58
†
*
**
***
Significant at 10%, Significant at 5%, Significant at 1%, Significant at 0.1%

Table 5. Estimates from logistic regression on successful assembly of properties in negotiations
with positive available gains from trade.
Variable

Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Constant
-2.65†
(1.45)
ICSA Treatment
1.18
(0.73)
SSA Treatment
1.18
(0.86)
Negotiation Number
0.22
(0.76)
Available Surplus
0.10***
(in 10,000s)
(0.02)
Observations
72
2
Pseudo R
0.361
2
Likelihood Ratio χ
26.59
†
Significant at 10%,* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%, *** Significant at 0.1%
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Table 6. Estimates from OLS regression on normalized surplus.
Variable

Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
ICSA Treatment
177,208*
(82,091)
SSA Treatment
198,208*
(82,091)
Negotiation Number
-91,333†
(49,503)
Observations
48
2
Adjusted R
0.091
F-Statistic
2.59
†
*
**
Significant at 10%, Significant at 5%, Significant at 1%, *** Significant at 0.1%
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Table 7. Successful assembly in each negotiation by treatment. Negotiations are listed in rank
order of the available gains from assembly in ECU.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Available Gains
from Assembly
765,000
715,000
681,000
620,000
570,000
445,000
443,000
441,000
439,000
438,000
402,000
358,000
348,000
347,000
342,000
341,000
337,000
337,000
285,000
245,000
132,000
52,000
8,000
5,000
(34,000)
(48,000)
(83,000)
(113,000)
(147,000)
(200,000)

Ultimatum
Treatment
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Successful Assembly In
ICSA Treatment
SSA Treatment
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 8. Pairwise z-statistics from Mann-Whitney U tests comparing outcomes between
synthetic treatments.
Efficient
Assembly Rate

Inefficient
Assembly Rate

Total Surplus

Ultimatum
vs. ICSA

54.50***

-0.28

11.34***

Ultimatum
vs. SSA

22.94***

-17.78***

11.25***

ICSA vs. SSA

33.02***

17.55***

-0.13

†

Significant at 10%,* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%, *** Significant at
0.1%
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Table 9. Pairwise Cohen’s d statistics of effect sizes between synthetic treatments.
Efficient
Assembly Rate

Inefficient
Assembly Rate

Total Surplus

Ultimatum
vs. ICSA

0.84

0.01

0.16

Ultimatum
vs. SSA

0.34

0.27

0.17

ICSA vs. SSA

0.49

0.26

0.01

Effect size cutoffs: d > 1.2 (Very Large); d > 0.8 (Large); d > 0.5 (Medium);
d > 0.2 (Small); d < 0.2 (Very Small)

Table 10. Estimates from logistic regression comparing assembly in the present study to
assembly in the Baseline treatment of DeSantis, McCarter and Winn (2019).
Variable

Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Constant
-3.07*
(1.23)
Ultimatum Treatment
1.38†
(0.77)
ICSA Treatment
2.57**
(0.93)
SSA Treatment
2.57**
(0.93)
Negotiation Number
-0.49
(0.62)
Available Surplus
0.10***
(in 10,000s)
(0.02)
Observations
96
Pseudo R2
0.385
Likelihood Ratio χ2
43.96
†
*
**
Significant at 10%, Significant at 5%, Significant at 1%, *** Significant at 0.1%
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Figure 1. The theoretical tax function is represented by the blue, dashed curve. The implemented
tax function is represented by the red, solid curve. For simplicity, we assume the sum of the
neighbors’ declarations is equal to zero. The solid vertical lines represent the bounds of the
buyer’s value range: [300,000, 1,250,000].
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Figure 2. Close-up of the graphing tool on participants’ user interfaces, which allowed them to
visualize their tax formula and expected earnings based on the expected declarations of their
counterparts.

53

Figure 3. Average premium (in ECU) sellers charged above their induced values in each treatment.
Error bars indicate the standard errors.

Figure 4. Rate of successful assembly in negotiations with the potential for positive gains from
trade.
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Figure 5. Average gains from trade (in ECU) in each treatment. (Note: The maximum available
gains from trade were 379,000 ECU per positive-sum negotiation.)

Figure 6. Average percent of positive-sum negotiations in which assembly occurred in the
synthetic treatments.

55

Figure 7. Average percent of negative-sum negotiations in which assembly occurred in the
synthetic treatments.

Figure 8. Average gains from trade per simulated session in the synthetic treatments.
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Appendix A. Detailed derivations of the Ultimatum and SSA equilibrium declarations
We first consider the case of the Ultimatum mechanism. Suppose there are 𝑁𝑁 sellers with

declarations 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and reservation values 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁. Further, suppose each seller has the

following expected utility function:

𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 )] = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )�𝑈𝑈(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )
=

𝐵𝐵−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵−𝐴𝐴

(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + �1 −

𝐵𝐵−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵−𝐴𝐴

� (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ).

(A1)
(A2)

Differentiating with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , setting the derivative to zero, and solving for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 leads to the
following system of first order conditions
1

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 2(1+𝑡𝑡) [𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝑡𝑡)𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ], 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁𝑁

(A3)

where each equation represents a seller’s best response to the sum of his neighbors’
declarations, 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑘𝑘=1 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 . If seller 𝑖𝑖 assumes his neighbors are also maximizing the same
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖

expected utility function, then his equilibrium declaration is given by
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ =

𝐵𝐵+𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 −𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖
(𝑁𝑁+1)(1+𝑡𝑡)

, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁𝑁

(A4)

where 𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the sum of the reservation values of seller 𝑖𝑖’s neighbors. This is
determined by iteratively substituting the best response bid 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁, 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖 into equation

(A3) for seller 𝑖𝑖. Suppose 𝑁𝑁 = 4 as in our experiments and consider seller 1. Substituting
𝑥𝑥2 =
into equation (A3) yields

1
[𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝑡𝑡)𝑋𝑋−2 ]
2(1 + 𝑡𝑡)
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𝑥𝑥1 =

1
[𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 2𝑟𝑟1 − (1 + 𝑡𝑡)(𝑥𝑥3 + 𝑥𝑥4 ) − 𝑟𝑟2 ].
3(1 + 𝑡𝑡)

Repeating this process for the best responses of sellers 3 and 4 (i.e., substitution of equation (A3)
for 𝑥𝑥3 and 𝑥𝑥4 ) leads to
𝑥𝑥1∗ =
Generalizing to 𝑁𝑁 sellers gives (A4).

𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 4𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑅𝑅−1
.
5(1 + 𝑡𝑡)

We next consider the SSA mechanism.

Again, suppose there are 𝑁𝑁 sellers with

declarations 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and reservation values 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁. Further, suppose each seller has the same
expected utility function given in Section 4.4:

𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 )] = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )�𝑈𝑈(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )
=

𝐵𝐵−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵−𝐴𝐴

(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + �1 −

𝐵𝐵−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵−𝐴𝐴

� (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ).

(A5)
(A6)

Differentiating with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , setting the derivative to zero, and solving for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 leads to the
following system of first order conditions
1

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 2 [𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴) + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 ], 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁𝑁

(A7)

where each equation represents a seller’s best response to the sum of his neighbors’
declarations, 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑘𝑘=1 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 . If seller 𝑖𝑖 assumes his neighbors are also maximizing the same
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖

expected utility function, then his equilibrium declaration is given by
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ =

𝐵𝐵−𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵−𝐴𝐴)+𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 −𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁+1
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, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁𝑁

(A8)

where 𝑅𝑅−𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the sum of the reservation values of seller 𝑖𝑖’s neighbors. This is
determined by iteratively substituting the best response bid 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁, 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖 into equation

(A7) for seller 𝑖𝑖. Suppose 𝑁𝑁 = 4 as in our experiments and consider seller 1. Substituting

into equation (A7) yields

1
𝑥𝑥2 = [𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴) + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋−2 ]
2

1
𝑥𝑥1 = [𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴) + 2𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑥𝑥3 − 𝑥𝑥4 − 𝑟𝑟2 ].
3

Repeating this process for the best responses of sellers 3 and 4 (i.e., substitution of equation (A7)
for 𝑥𝑥3 and 𝑥𝑥4 ) leads to
𝑥𝑥1∗ =

Generalizing to 𝑁𝑁 sellers gives (A8).

𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴) + 4𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑅𝑅−1
.
5

59

Appendix B. Division of surplus between buyers and sellers.

In addition to total gains from trade policymakers and stakeholders may be interested in how
much surplus was captured by each side of the market. In this appendix we present the results
from both the experiments as well as the synthetic treatments.
B.1 Results from Experiments
Figure B1 displays the average buyer surplus and seller surplus in each treatment. On
average, in Ultimatum the buyers captured about 171,000 ECU and the sellers captured about
139,000 ECU. In ICSA the buyers earned approximately 232,000 ECU, an increase of 36%
relative to Ultimatum. However, sellers in ICSA earned an average of approximately 117,000
ECU, a decrease of almost 16%. In contrast, both buyers and sellers earned more in SSA relative
to Ultimatum. The average surplus captured by buyers was about 214,000 in SSA, and the
average surplus captured by the sellers was about 157,000. These are increases of approximately
25% and 13% relative to Ultimatum.
Regression analyses indicate that the surplus gains to the buyers were statistically
significant in the self-assessment treatments, while the changes to seller surplus were not. We
normalized the buyer and seller surplus data as we had the total surplus data, by subtracting the
buyer or seller surplus that had been achieved in the equivalent negotiation in the Ultimatum
treatment. We then fit these data to OLS models with treatment dummies and the negotiation
number as the independent variables. The models’ estimates are displayed in Table B1.
The model of buyer surplus estimates that buyers captured more surplus in the first round
of ICSA and SSA than in Ultimatum, but not in the second round. The estimated coefficient for
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ICSA is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.040), and the estimated coefficient for SSA is
positive and marginally significant (p = 0.068). The estimated coefficient of the negotiation
number is negative but not statistically significant (p = 0.164). Summing the ICSA and
negotiation number coefficients results in an estimate that the buyer captured 93,579 ECU more
in the ICSA treatment than in Ultimatum, and this is statistically significant (F-test, p = 0.020).
Using the same analysis for SSA, the model estimates that the buyer captured 74,979 ECU more
in the first round of SSA than Ultimatum. This effect is marginally significant (F-test, p =
0.059). However, if we set the negotiation number equal to two, the estimated treatment effects
become statistically insignificant (F-tests, p > 0.4 in both cases).
The seller surplus model finds no significant treatment effects or effect due to experience.
The estimated coefficients for ICSA, SSA and negotiation number are all statistically
insignificant (p > 0.4 in all cases). Thus, in our experiments the buyer gained a temporary
increase in surplus due to self-assessment, while sellers were unaffected.
B.2 Results from Synthetic Treatments
An analysis of buyer and seller surplus in the synthetic treatments shows that the largest effect of
self-assessment is not on the gains in overall performance, but the division of those gains. Figure
B1 shows the average buyer and seller surplus for each synthetic treatment. Average buyer surplus
was highest in the synthetic ICSA treatment (5.6 million ECU), followed by SSA (4.9 million ECU)
and Ultimatum (4.6 million ECU). Comparing treatments via pair-wise Mann-Whitney U tests
yields significant results. Z-statistics for each comparison are presented in Table B2. In addition,
the effect size between Ultimatum and ICSA is large (d = 0.99), while the difference between
Ultimatum and SSA is of small size (d = 0.30) (see Table B3). In contrast, average seller surplus
was lowest in synthetic ICSA (2.4 million ECU), followed by Ultimatum and SSA (3.2 million
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ECU each). The effect size of the difference between Ultimatum and ICSA is very large (d = 1.30),
and the effect size is very small between Ultimatum and SSA (d = 0.07).
The synthetic results on buyer and seller surplus suggest that ICSA would be quite
unpopular relative to Ultimatum. Synthetic ICSA had a large positive impact on buyer welfare at
the expense of a large negative impact on seller welfare. Due to the large number of landowners
relative to developers, we would expect ICSA to face steep political opposition. Synthetic SSA, on
the other hand, gave buyers a small welfare improvement with no loss to sellers. This could
produce a motivated interest group unopposed by an indifferent public, making SSA a politically
feasible tax regime.
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Table B1. Estimates from OLS regressions on normalized surplus captured by the buyers and
sellers.
Buyers
Sellers
Variable
Coefficient
Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
*
ICSA Treatment
156,708
25,500
(73,962)
(75,548)
SSA Treatment
138,108†
60,100
(73,962)
(75,548)
Negotiation Number
-63,129
-28,204
(44,600)
(45,557)
Observations
48
48
2
Adjusted R
0.090
-0.040
F-Statistic
2.59
0.38
†
*
**
***
Significant at 10%, Significant at 5%, Significant at 1%, Significant at 0.1%

Table B2. Pairwise z-statistics from Mann-Whitney U tests comparing outcomes between
synthetic treatments.
Buyer’s Surplus

Sellers’ Surplus

Ultimatum vs. ICSA

62.53***

-77.68***

Ultimatum vs. SSA

20.23***

-4.15***

ICSA vs. SSA

45.31***

-76.66***

†

Significant at 10%,* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%, *** Significant at
0.1%
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Table B3. Pairwise Cohen’s d statistics of effect sizes between synthetic treatments.
Buyer’s Surplus

Sellers’ Surplus

Ultimatum vs. ICSA

0.99

1.30

Ultimatum vs. SSA

0.30

0.07

ICSA vs. SSA

0.69

1.28

Effect size cutoffs: d > 1.2 (Very Large); d > 0.8 (Large); d > 0.5 (Medium);
d > 0.2 (Small); d < 0.2 (Very Small)

Figure B1. Average gains from trade (in ECU) captured by the buyers and sellers in each treatment.
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